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he was the steward of all creation, serving the only
true and all-powerful God.
Under Walton’s reading of Genesis 3, we, as
fallen creatures, have not only failed in our task
of taking non-order and bringing it to a state of
order, but we have instead allowed disorder to proliferate. We do worse than failing to fulfill our creational obligations; we have damaged the creation
by bringing disorder, a disastrous problem that
can only be overcome by a redeemer. For Walton,
in Adam “we did not lose paradise as much as we
forfeited sacred space and the relationship it offered, thereby damaging our ability to be in relationship with God and marring his creation with
our own underdeveloped ability to bring order
on our own in our own wisdom” (145). It is only
through Christ our redeemer that paradise can
be attained—not a paradise restored, then, but a
paradise newly gained.
Throughout the book, Walton puts forth many
apparently new interpretations of familiar, key

verses in Christian theology. Walton’s propositions
are effectively theological hypotheses that must be
tested by theologians over the next decade. If his
interpretive framework, including his description
of the cultural context of the ANE, is sound, it
seems likely that many of his propositions will find
additional Biblical support as they are explored
further. If the conclusions that he has reached do
not find further exegetical support, his primary
thesis will, of course, need to be reassessed. What
we have been given in this book, though, is a series
of thought-provoking, at times challenging, propositions that should be discussed and debated in
Reformed and evangelical communities for years
to come.
Where will Walton turn his attention next? I
assume that he will test his interpretative framework and use his knowledge of the ANE to see
what new insights it may bring to the Lost World
of Noah. At least we should hope he does.

Justice in Love. Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company,
2015. (Paperback with New Preface). 306pp. ISBN: 978-0802872944. Reviewed by Ben Gibson,
Candidate for Masters of Religion in Ethics, Yale Divinity School.
Discussions about the relationship between
justice and love have become a regular part of
Christian philosophy and ethics over the past decade.1 Is Christ’s call to love in concert or conflict
with liberalism’s call to justice? Can Scripture’s
love-command serve as a consistent ethic? Nicholas
Wolterstorff seeks to answer such questions and
many others in his new book, Justice in Love. The
book serves as a companion to his Justice: Rights
and Wrongs (2008), in which he sought to root contemporary discourse around rights within JudeoChristian teaching—in Christian thinkers, the
New Testament writings, and the Old Testament
Scriptures. Although Justice in Love may be read
as part of Wolterstorff’s publications on justice, in
this book he does a fine job of summarizing this
previous work at pertinent moments, which makes
Justice in Love accessible as a stand-alone text.
Wolterstorff begins by leveling a critique of the
last century of agape ethics. He then attempts to
construct an account of love’s compatibility with
justice, to give an extensive treatment of the literature around forgiveness and to perform a corresponding exegesis of Romans. Ambitious as this is,
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how can such wildly diverse projects dwell between
the two covers of one book? Wolterstorff views
each of these individual sections as part and parcel
of the larger project of reconciling the concepts of
love and justice, two concepts that he believes have
been rent asunder by scholars from various disciplines and backgrounds. In order to bring the two
concepts back into harmony, Wolterstorff engages
in dialogue with many disciplines: philosophy,
theology, ethics, political theory, and Biblical studies, to name only a few. Thus, while the structure
of Justice in Love may seem daunting, it is undertaken by a scholar who recognizes the complexities
and far-reaching implications of speaking about
love and justice.
In order to fully understand what Wolterstorff
is attempting through this book, one needs a
cursory understanding of the 20th-century debate about love as agapism. Among the loves
named in the New Testament—philia, eros, and
agape—agape is widely regarded as the fulfillment of Christ’s love-commandment found in
the Synoptic Gospels (Matthew 22:37-39; Luke
10:25-28; Mark 12:28-31): “ ‘Love the Lord your

God with all your heart and with all your soul and
with all your mind.’ This is the first and greatest
commandment. And the second is like it: ‘Love
your neighbor as yourself.’” In issuing this command, Christ proclaimed a radically different ethic
that theologians, philosophers, and ethicists alike
have all sought to unravel.
Wolterstorff uses the first half of his book to
differentiate his understanding of agape from
that of recent agapists such as Swedish Lutheran
theologian Anders Nygren. In his expansive and
widely contested Agape and Eros (1930-1936),
Nygren proposed agape as a completely distinctive
ethic for the Christian life. Wolterstorff refers to
this agape-ethic as “classical modern day agapism,”
an agape which focuses entirely on gratuitous benevolence to the exclusion of any other motivation. Agape, according to Nygren, only flows from
God’s love of us to others; our own concerns with
attachment (philia), attraction (eros), or justice
are at best distractions and at worst corruptions
of true Christ-like love. Not only does justice, for
Nygren, do less than love requires, but when an
individual is concerned with justice, this concern
disrupts the possibility of true and self-sacrificing
agape. Agape, then, may act paternalistically; I
may disregard the rights of my neighbor as long as
I am pursuing his or her good.
Wolterstorff levels a thoughtful critique of
Nygren’s account of agape that demonstrates
Nygren’s failure to take seriously the compatibility
of justice and love and the position of Scripture.
To note one apt critique found in the book,
Wolterstorff describes how Nygren failed to recognize that the exemplar of classical modern day
agape, God’s forgiveness of sins, requires a conception of justice to make it meaningful: “This is irony indeed, that the manifestation of love that the
modern day agapist cites as paradigmatic of God’s
love and the model for ours should undermine his
claim that the love of Jesus asks of us pays no attention to justice and injustice” (53). At the very
moment that Nygren claimed that God foregoes
what justice requires by forgiving, Wolterstorff
identifies that the very act of forgiveness requires
a robust conception of justice. Forgiveness, according to Wolterstorff, is a recognition of being
wronged, and a foregoing of one’s corrective rights
against the perpetrator of the wrong. Forgiveness,
rather than abolishing justice, requires a notion

of what is just to be meaningfully actionable: “If
forgiveness is an example of the sort of love that
Jesus enjoined us to have for the neighbor, such
love cannot be deaf and blind to injustice; it has to
be alert to justice and injustice” (55).
However, throughout his criticism of contemporary agapism, Wolterstorff paints with a
broad brush stroke. Under this umbrella of classical modern day agapism, Wolterstorff tends to
lump together figures as diverse as Nygren, Soren
Kierkegaard, and Paul Ramsey. More than slight
shades of difference appear in the thoughts of these
three men, and thus we as readers are left asking,
“What use is there in characterizing each of them
as benevolence-agapists? Wolterstorff would seem
better served by focusing his critique on Nygren,
who is his paradigmatic benevolence-agapist, and
using the other thinkers to help in his own constructive project.
In place of this benevolence-agapism,
Wolterstorff offers a constructive account of a
justice-oriented care-agapism. In this constructive section of the book, Wolterstorff’s argument
is the most compelling. He insists that, opposed
to Nygren’s characterization, “New Testament
agape joins seeking to promote a person’s good
with seeking to secure due respect for her worth;
it seeks both as ends in themselves” (93). Rather
than disregarding justice and eros, Wolterstorff
sees agape as meaningfully incorporating them
into a robust vision of love as care-agapism. Care,
as opposed to benevolence, does not seek to simply
enact love through self-sacrificial giving, but loves
through acknowledging worth and investing in
long-term goods. Love as care seeks justice for the
other, takes seriously the need to care for oneself,
and measures paternalistic actions carefully. By positioning care as the preeminent interpretation of
agape, Wolterstorff attempts to dethrone Nygren’s
dualistic account of agape and gives an account of
love as concerned with each step of creation, fall,
redemption, and reconciliation, not simply the final two.
The constructive section of the book, however,
fails to identify the full scope of application for
care-agapism. Wolterstorff helpfully suggests rules
for applying this type of agape ethic in practice,
but he fails to identify meaningful differences between individuals acting as individuals and individuals acting on behalf of an organization, such
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as the state. When individuals step into the role of
governance, do they attempt to maintain an ethic
of agapism? Wolterstorff attempts to make some
limited punishment and paternalism possible
through love as care, but it is unclear whether these
amendments to agape extend far enough to accommodate the agapists who are required by their
role to punish a wrongdoer or to make a decision
for citizens that they would be unable to make on
their own.2 Wolterstorff does not make clear here
whether there exists or ought to exist any morally
significant difference when the individual acts on
behalf of the state.
In the final two sections of Justice in Love,
Wolterstorff attempts to ground this re-characterization of agape through two other discussions:
the relationship of justice, forgiveness, and punishment, and an exegetical treatment of Romans.
These final sections may hold incidental value
for interdisciplinary dialogue or for practitioners (such as pastors or counselors) approaching
Wolterstorff’s text. However, these parts of the text
do not add significant contributions to the critique
and construction found in the first two sections.
By the end of Part Two, Wolterstorff has given an
intriguing construction of justice and love’s compatibility that would spark further thought and
dialogue on its own. This is not to suggest that the
further discussions are not worthwhile, but that
this text may not have been the proper venue to
attempt such expansive discussions. In particular,
Wolterstorff’s exegetical treatment of Romans with
a renewed focus on the justice of God feels disconnected from the rest of the text. While Wolterstorff
makes provocative suggestions by engaging the
New Perspective on Paul, his conclusions often
feel largely disconnected from his larger discussion
of agape.

Justice in Love serves as an excellent primer for
understanding the complexities of the relationship of love and justice, both philosophically and
practically. His critique of Nygren’s work and his
constructive alternative contribute significantly
to discussions about the love commandment and
an agape love-ethic. This text, I believe, will prove
beneficial to Christian theorists and practitioners
alike in developing an ethic of justice, self-love,
and world engagement. While much of the discussion surrounding agape has been undertaken
by voices emphasizing its radical distinctiveness,
Wolterstorff helpfully speaks from a Reformed
perspective that situates agape within a broader
understanding of God’s sovereign plan for human
life. At his best moments in the text, Wolterstorff
offers a vision of Christ’s call to love that takes seriously care for the self, justice for all, and a transformational agapism aimed at healing a broken
world.
Endnotes
1. Of particular note are Eric Gregory, Politics
and the Orders of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of
Democratic Citizenship, Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 2008; and Timothy Jackson,
Political Agape: Christian Love and Liberal
Democracy, Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 2015. Both of
these authors dedicate more time and thought
to the question of how compatible love is with
variants of justice specific to Liberalism.
2. Think of the archetypal judge in Book XIX of
Augustine’s City of God, who is called to and
carries out his task in this fallen world but recognizes the tension of his position.

I Still Believe: Leading Bible Scholars Share Their Stories of Faith and Scholarship. John Byron and Joel
Lohr, eds. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2015. 249 pp. ISBN 970-0310515166. Reviewed by Jamin
Hübner, Assistant Professor of Christian Studies and Director of Institutional Effectiveness, John
Witherspoon College.
One of the greatest glories of the Christian
faith is its ancient and diverse tradition of changed
lives. From Abraham to Augustine, Hagar to
Mary, Luther to Lewis, and the millions of others
throughout history, one cannot help but marvel
at the power of the Christian message and God’s
44
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unrelenting pursuit of individuals. In many ways,
personal and public testimony embodies the gospel; for in telling others about God’s grace in our
lives, we preach the good news about Christ: real,
local, and meaningful (or in more trendy terms,
“genuine, authentic, raw”).

